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1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The constructed opposites of formality and informality have been a constant of the 
development discourse for more than half a century. They have anchored theoretical, 
empirical, and policy discussion in many disciplines as they have studied the development 
process. In the 1940s, the Dutch anthropologist Boeke (1942) developed a vision of a 
developing economy as a ‘dual’ economy, comprised of the market economy part of the 
world and a part which lay outside. In the 1950s, Arthur Lewis (1954) conceptualized an 
influential two-sector model of development in which one sector had modern capitalist 
firms that maximized profit, while the other sector was comprised of peasant households 
where the rules for sharing output were different. In the 1970s, the Harris and Todaro 
(1970) model in development economics brought the dual economy into the standard two-
sector framework of equilibrium economics. In development studies more generally, 
however, the paper by Keith Hart (1973) and the ILO mission to Kenya (ILO 1972) 
established the importance of the dichotomy, and led to an outpouring of research and 
policy focus. It has helped to organize thinking, it has served to structure official statistics, 
and it has generated a series of policy measures to ‘help’ the informal sector. 
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Despite this pedigree, the usefulness of the formal–informal dichotomy has constantly been 
debated in the literature. Early critiques include that by Bromley (1978). Lipton (1984) 
defends the usefulness of the concept of the informal sector, but argues for care and nuance 
in application. Over the past 30 years, this ‘to and fro’ has continued as new evidence from 
new areas has been brought to bear on the debate. For example, detailed work, in the 1980s 
and the 1990s, on the management of common property regimes has shed new light on 
what were once considered to be ‘informal’ arrangements (McCay and Acheson 1987; 
Ostrom 1990; Bromley et al. 1992). Policies introduced to ‘formalize’ these arrangements 
have been criticized in light of their sometimes counterproductive consequences (Platteau 
2004; Platteau and Gaspart 2003; Agrawal and Gupta 2005). In the last few years, the idea 
of extending formal legal property rights to the ‘informal’ sector has taken hold as a 
possible powerful policy tool to help the poor make the best of their assets (de Soto 1989, 
2003; but see Alden Wily, chapter 15, this volume). In light of these developments, it is 
appropriate to consider once again the conceptual and empirical basis of the formal–
informal divide, and to assess carefully its policy implications. 
 
This chapter introduces a significant new collection of studies on formality and informality 
in developing countries. The chapters were originally presented at a major conference 
organized in Helsinki in September 2004 by the Expert Group on Development Issues 
(EGDI) at the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the World Institute for 
Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER). All of the chapters use the 
terminology of formal and informal, and some make use of the conceptual dichotomy to 
begin the discussion. Most of the chapters, however, highlight the basic thesis of this 
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chapter—that we need to move beyond formality and informality to make progress in 
understanding the realities of economic activities in poor countries, and to design policies 
to benefit the poor. The materials in these chapters, as well as the broader literature, form 
the basis of the arguments advanced in this introduction to the volume. 
 
The plan of this chapter is as follows. Section 1.2 addresses the conceptualization of formal 
versus informal. Section 1.3 begins the discussion of policy by specifying the objectives of 
interventions in this area. Section 1.4 continues the policy analysis by examining some of 
the lessons learned and deriving recommendations for successful policy intervention, based 
on experiences in a range of countries and situations. Section 1.5 concludes by renewing 
the call for the development discourse to go beyond formality and informality. 
 
1.2 CONCEPTUALIZING FORMAL AND INFORMAL 
Given the prominence of the formal–informal dichotomy in the development discourse, one 
might expect to see a clear definition of the concepts, consistently applied across the whole 
range of theoretical, empirical, and policy analyzes. We find no such thing. Instead, it turns 
out that formal and informal are better thought of as metaphors that conjure up a mental 
picture of whatever the user has in mind at that time. 
 
In his early defense of the informal sector (IS) concept, Lipton (1984: 196) set out the 
problem as follows: ‘The IS concept has become discredited on account of three alleged 
deficiencies: misplaced dualism, misplaced isolation and confusion’. He then goes on to 
specify each critique and to mount a defense against it. Misplaced dualism refers to the fact 
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that in practice there is no clear split between formal and informal; rather, there is a 
continuum. The defense is that a dichotomy can nevertheless prove useful in analytical 
terms. Misplaced isolation is the neglect of the fact that the relationships of the informal 
sector to the rest of the economy are not investigated. While this is a valid critique of some 
of the literature, as Lipton also notes, we agree with Lipton that this is not an inherent 
weakness of the dichotomy, but rather of the uses to which it is put. 
 
Under the third critique, that of confusion, is the idea that the characteristics of this sector 
are not well spelt out. Nor, relatedly, are the entities that would fall into this sector. So we 
come to a situation where Harriss (1978: 1,077, quoted in Lipton 1984) says, ‘It is for the 
initiates to spot IS and they know it when they see it’. Lipton’s (1984) defense is that in 
standard sources (such as ILO 1972; Sethuraman 1976; Souza and Tokman 1976), only 
three key characteristics are used to define IS. These are: (1) ‘substantial overlap between 
providers of capital and providers of labour in each enterprise’ (pp. 198-200); (2) 
‘prevalence of perfect, or rather ... near-perfect, competition’ (p. 200); and (3) ‘IS consists 
largely of “unorganised,” unincorporated enterprises, to which legal restrictions on 
employment (wage minima, regulations affecting working conditions, etc.) and on 
acquisitions of non-labour inputs (licenses, quotas, etc.) do not apply ...’ (pp. 200-201). 
 
However, in the literature since Lipton (1984), the tendency to use many different 
characterizations has persisted. A bewildering range of (often only implicit) definitions are 
used to discuss the formal and the informal. Reviews since Lipton (1984) have concluded 
that there are competing perspectives rather than a single dichotomy (Portes and Schauffler 
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1993; Cross 1998), and this view is supported by the most recent examinations of the 
literature (Christensen, chapter 3, this volume; Sindzingre, chapter 4, this volume). And 
discussions of the formal and the informal have been enriched considerably by the 
literature of the past two decades on (self) organization of common property regimes 
(Ostrom 2005), and by the push in some policy circles to extend property rights to groups 
of individuals who do not currently ‘enjoy’ such rights (de Soto 2003).  
 
Not surprisingly, the views on the entities that comprise the informal sector also differ 
greatly. Lipton (1984) argued strongly for the ‘Family Mode of Production’ as a general 
category that fell naturally into this category. In official statistics, different countries use 
the terms differently in detail even when they might mean the same thing in a general sense 
(Muller and Esselaar 2004; Narayana, chapter 6, this volume; Sindzingre, chapter 4, this 
volume). The international official definitions, for example as codified by the ILO, have 
been expanding. The current official definition of ‘informal sector’ was adopted by the 
1993 International Conference of Labor Statisticians based on characterizing an enterprise 
as informal. In 2003, guidelines were introduced to expand the definition to include 
informal employment outside informal enterprises, with an appropriate definition of the 
former (Chen, chapter 5, this volume).  
 
From this mass of alternative uses of the terms and alternative characterizations, we would 
like to highlight two strands that are particularly relevant for the current policy dialogue. 
The first strand is the notion of informal as being outside the reach of different levels and 
mechanisms of official governance and formal as being reachable by these mechanisms. 
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This notion underlies many official definitions of ‘informal enterprises’ as those that are 
not registered and are legally outside the tax net. It also underlies many analytical 
investigations of enterprises and activities that operate illegally, in violation of formal state 
rules and regulations, even though informality and illegality are not considered to be 
equivalent in this notion. This notion also animates the lively policy debate on the extent to 
which the informal sector owes its existence to ‘overly constraining’ official regulations 
which lead to economic activity taking place outside this net, either by organizing so that 
the regulations do not formally apply, or operating in contravention of the regulations. And, 
of course, this is also the dimension that best captures different views on the benefits or 
otherwise of extending the reach of official structures to where they currently do not reach 
(e.g., legal property rights), or of reducing this reach (e.g. labour regulations). 
 
The second strand that can be discerned in the discourse, and which we believe to be 
important in shaping policy responses, has to do with the nature of organization. The 
informal is often identified with ‘lacking structure’ and the formal with ‘structured’—the 
term ‘unorganized sector’ is often used. Other cross-cutting themes one finds are ‘simple’ 
versus ‘complex’ or ‘irregular’ versus ‘predictable’ (Hart, chapter 2, this volume). In the 
policy discourse, the association of the informal with unstructured has been a powerful 
impetus for interventions that have often led to disaster. A striking illustration of this is the 
attempt to nationalize forests in Nepal, based on the analysis that deforestation was being 
caused by the inability of small local communities to prevent environmental degradation 
(Ives and Messerli 1989). In fact, as we now know, the local communities had better 
structures in place to deal with the deforestation that was the result of population and other 
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pressures (Arnold 1993; Varughese and Ostrom 2001). These structures were not 
recognized, and were replaced by the formal state structures which proved to be ineffective 
and corrupt leading to even faster deforestation (Gilmour and Fisher 1991; Waltner-Toews 
et al. 2003). Now, the government of Nepal is trying to reverse its earlier policy and is 
turning many forests over to Forest User Groups that it organizes (Nagendra and Ostrom, 
forthcoming). 
 
Exactly the opposite is true of the software industry of India, now recognized as a world 
leader. It flourished under the entrepreneurship of some highly skilled and far-sighted 
individuals, quickly becoming the fastest growing export sector of India. Its current 
reforms notwithstanding, India still remains a fairly regulated economy, but the 
government was surprisingly non-interfering as far as the software sector was concerned. 
Even until very recently, the industry’s output and exports were categorized as 
‘miscellaneous’ in India’s national accounts (as opposed to being called ‘manufacturing’ or 
‘services’), such was the degree of informality. The initial abstinence of the government 
was indeed a blessing in disguise.  
 
These two dimensions—the reach of official governance and the degree of structuring—
need to be further specified and made precise,i but they provide an initial entry to a 
framework for capturing the many definitions that abound in the literature. In this 
conception, an economic activity can be characterized along two dimensions. The first is 
the extent to which it interacts with, or comes into the net of, the structures of official 
governance at the national or local levels.ii The question of whether an employer is 
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registered or not with a governmental unit would be a simple illustration of this dimension 
(see chapters 2-6 in Part 1 of this volume). The second dimension is the extent to which an 
activity and the interactions among its constituent individuals are structured according to a 
predictable framework (not necessarily one that is written down). Muller and Esselaar 
(2004), for example, refer to the casualization of employment as involving employees of 
both registered and unregistered firms who lack a written contract or any form of employee 
benefits. They find that a significant number of employees have a casual (e.g., 
unstructured) relationship with employers in South Africa. 
 
The distinction between the two dimensions is not redundant. This is illustrated for 
example by the detailed empirical work showing the highly structured interactions within 
groups that manage common-pool resources, far removed from any interaction with official 
governance (Tucker and Ostrom 2005; Ostrom 2005). Moreover, for similar levels of 
connection with the state tax system, we see enterprises with very different types and 
complexities of internal structure. 
 
The two dimensions do, however, interact. On the one hand, attempts by official 
governance to extend its reach, for example, by widening a regulation to an area where it 
was not previously applied, will in general lead to a response that may move some 
activities outside the reach of the regulation (legally or illegally). In so doing, it may well 
change the structuring of the activities that escape the official net. It has been observed, for 
example, that relationships within illegal activities are often very highly structured, 
sometimes more so than in legal activities, as a response to the risks of the activity in 
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question (Gambetta 1996). By the same token, some types of (re)structuring of activities 
make official intervention easier, or may even be predicated by the nature of the official 
governance frameworks. For example, as an enterprise expands, it can be monitored and 
taxed more easily. As another example, if an enterprise wants to become a publicly held 
company, it can only do so within the framework of existing company law, by definition. 
 
Thus both dimensions are needed to adequately characterize activities and to analyze 
interventions. And it is not helpful to say that activities to one extreme of both 
dimensions—for example with high official intervention and highly structured 
interactions—are ‘formal’ while those at the other end are ‘informal’.  
 
On the policy front, as the chapters in this collection make clear, the policy issue is not one 
of ‘greater’ or ‘lesser’ reach of government being better in general, as it is so often 
characterized, but one of the ‘right’ reach of government (Söderbaum, chapter 9, this 
volume; Shuaib 2004). This ‘right’ reach has to take into account (1) the objectives of 
intervention, (2) the implementation of the intervention, and (3) the response of the 
structuring of activities to this intervention—it being recognized that ‘more’ or ‘less’ 
structured does not necessarily correlate with ‘good’ or ‘bad’ (Nugent and Swaminathan, 
chapter 12, this volume). 
 
What then are we to do with the terms ‘formal’ and ‘informal’? It seems clear that they 
cannot be suppressed—they are now too well ingrained in the academic and policy 
discourse. And, as Lipton (1984) argues, their continued use despite all the debates perhaps 
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suggests a continued utility. We would propose, therefore, especially in light of official 
statistical conventions already adopted, that the formal–informal continuum apply strictly 
to the continuum between relatively high and relatively low levels of the reach of official 
governance mechanisms, suitably specified and measured in each context. This relates the 
terminology directly to the policy discourse on the nature and extent of government 
intervention in economic activity. This is our preferred option. However, even in this case 
we would prescribe a health warning—informal does not mean unstructured and chaotic, 
and does not invite policy intervention on those grounds! More generally, we would keep 
the ‘reach of government’ as a purely descriptive term, leaving the issue of whether it is a 
good thing or a bad thing to be decided on a case by case basis, taking into account the self 
organizing structures that communities are capable of producing, within or without the 
reach of official structures.  
 
1.3 OBJECTIVES AND COMPLEXITIES OF INTERVENTIONS 
At the broadest level our objective is to understand diverse ways of improving the well-
being of the poor in poor countries. We recognize that poor individuals and others interact 
with each other and with the rest of society through two primary channels—self-organized 
groups and markets. The objectives of intervention can then be seen under two broad 
headings: (1) Improving the well-being of the poor and of society at large by improving the 
capacity of individuals to self-organize and address their collective action problems by 
themselves, and; (2) Improving the well-being of the poor and of society at large by 
addressing the problems that arise when individuals interact through markets.  
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These two objectives may be seen as addressing group failure and market failure, through 
better operation of self-organized groups and through better operation of markets. Of 
course, it goes without saying that the two objectives interact, with outcomes in one 
influencing outcomes in the other. The myriad of interventions that we actually see in 
practice can be assessed in the above framework. But why do some interventions achieve 
their objectives while others do not? 
 
A key step is to focus in on the goals of such efforts and the specificities of time and place. 
We have repeatedly learned from many studies of policy processes, that no single 
institutional arrangement works across diverse policy areas or even diverse subtypes within 
a broad policy area (Joshi 1998; Korten 1980; NRC 2002). Copying interventions that 
worked well in one country may lead to a major failure in another country (Webb 1991).  
 
For example, trying to find the best property rights for allocating forest resources (see 
Andersson and Pacheco, chapter 11, this volume) vary dramatically by the kind of specific 
forest problem one is trying to solve. Residual rights to a forest may be retained by 
individuals, private corporations, local indigenous communities, or local governments 
(Alden Wily, chapter 15, this volume). When there is pressure to move to commercial 
operations, local owners—whatever their form—may need to engage in contracting with a 
variety of professional organizations. Thus, not only are property rights to the residual 
income a major factor in sustaining resources or providing essential services to the poor, 
the type of non-governmental organization or for-profit entities that provide technical 
services are also a major factor. How their performance is monitored, what kind of 
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contracting law can be used, and many other factors affect whether local users are able to 
devise sustainable forest management plans, gain income, or reduce their risks (Dietz et al. 
2003). Guha-Khasnobis and Ahuja (chapter 10, this volume) also stress the role of NGOs 
and micro-credit organizations in effectively organizing the poor to obtain specialized 
insurance plans from either private-for-profit insurance companies as well as from 
governmental insurance providers. 
 
At any one juncture in the history of a policy field a need for an increased role of national, 
regional, or local government agencies or an increased role of local NGOs and other kinds 
of non-governmental organizations may exist. All of the organizations involved may be 
constituted under the laws of a country even though they may not themselves be 
governmental units. Thus, all of the organizational arrangements may be formal in the 
sense that they are registered, recognized, and predictable, but many of them may not be 
governmental in structure. 
 
With a broad understanding of the goals of interventions discussed in this volume, and an 
eye for the complexities involved, we can try and synthesize the lessons of (positive and 
negative) experience with these interventions. The next section takes up this task. 
 
1.4 LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The chapters in this volume, and many others in the literature beyond, provide a rich 
empirical account of the working, or not, of a range of interventions directed towards the 
‘informal sector’. Some of these interventions try to extend the net of government 
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interventions into areas where they have not gone before. Others try to withdraw an 
intervention that exists. Sometimes these movements are referred to as increasing or 
decreasing the degree of ‘formalization’. The experiences indicate that no simple rule exists 
that increasing or decreasing ‘formalization’ necessarily improves or worsens the well-
being of the poor or welfare of society at large. Three examples illustrate this basic point. 
Söderbaum (chapter 9, this volume) describes the experience of the Maputo Development 
Corridor which was created in 1995 by the Governments of South Africa and Mozambique 
to increase private investments in infrastructure and industry. The corridor has been, for 
years, a location where extensive informal trading, particularly by women, has flourished. 
Massive investments of private capital have been encouraged to build major physical 
infrastructure, without much concern for building the economic opportunities of those 
living in the area. The biggest of all investment projects under the MDC initiative is Mozal, 
which contributes around 5 per cent of the GDP of Mozambique and nearly half of its 
manufacturing output. Yet, Mozal’s linkages with the domestic economy, in terms of 
creating additional employment in the region, is minimal. For other inputs too, most of 
Mozal’s dealings are with foreign (South African) firms based in Mozambique, its 
purchases from domestic enterprises being restricted to water and energy, which have little 
spread effect. With Mozambique’s development strategy showing an obsession with mega 
projects, the ‘informal’ sector is seen almost as a hindrance, rather than a potential 
contributor to growth.  
 
Nugent and Swaminathan (chapter 12, this volume), on the other hand, analyze the impact 
of formal governmental assistance to local health centers—posyandus—on the level of 
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volunteering by Indonesian women to these centers. They found positive effects on the 
level of volunteering and in the level of usage of the health center, of governmental 
investments (in the form of number of visits from paid medical staff and the number of 
medical instruments purchased with governmental funds). 
 
Sawyer (chapter 13, this volume) provides an entirely different view of the impact of more 
extensive government intervention when dealing with the problem of achieving peace after 
extended warfare. He finds that in the northwestern sections of Liberia, different ethnic 
groups rely on indigenous institutions, such as the poro, that are accepted across ethnic 
communities. These and other evolved mechanisms for conflict resolution and for 
organizing collective action, are slowly achieving a positive level of peaceful co-existence 
if not even productive entrepreneurship and interchange. In other regions of post-warfare 
Liberia, diverse groups have relied more on linkages to Monrovia to settle inter-group 
conflicts. Unfortunately, drawing on external relationships to the national capital has not 
enabled these communities to move ahead on the processes of reconciliation as rapidly 
those communities building their own mechanisms based on indigenous ways of coping 
with conflict. Rival elite groups have turned frequently to the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
and have focused more on who is selected for local government office rather than how to 
build schools, roads, and water systems. 
 
Thus, while specifics matter greatly and no general rules can be formulated, a number of 
themes run through the chapters of this book which can perhaps be brought together as a 
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small number of lessons learned to serve as recommendations for future work or evaluative 
criteria that could be applied. These include:  
• Subsidiarity in a Multi-Level System. Place the intervention as close as possible 
(in terms of level of government and/or geographically) to where it is meant to 
influence markets or groups, but imbed it in a larger system that supports the 
autonomy of lower level governments and provides them essential back-up 
services including conflict resolution.  
• Balance between ‘Formal’ Interventions and ‘Informal’ Practices. In other 
words, ‘formal’ interventions are more effective if they are not meant to replace 
or ‘crowd out’ ‘informal’ rules, but help fine-tune them instead.  
• Implementation Capacity. Design the intervention to be consistent with the 
implementation capacity of government, and the absorptive capacity of people it 
is meant to help. 
• Complementary Interventions. Interventions that work are usually in the form of 
a package. Complementary measures are needed to support the core intervention 
for it to work.  
• Use Voting With Their Feet as an Evaluation Criteria. If people try to move out 
of the net of an intervention in significant numbers, its presumed efficacy for 
their well-being must be questioned. If on the other hand people move into the 
net of an intervention (including when that intervention is reduced), this is a 
signal of its efficacy. 
Let us briefly discuss each of these general lessons. 
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Subsidiarity in a Multi-Level System  
For all too long, recommendations for structuring formal governmental structures have 
focused either on the need for greater centralization at the national level or for more 
decentralization to the local level. This should not be thought of as an either-or choice. 
Rather future policies should address what responsibilities to place at what level of 
governance and how to design multi-level governance systems that work effectively to 
provide desired services, collect taxes, and resolve conflicts in a timely, transparent, and 
equitable manner. To improve the welfare of those facing poverty conditions, Di Gregorio 
et al. (2004) stresses the importance of federal systems rather than highly centralized or 
fully decentralized systems. Tyrannical leaders can gain power at any level of governance. 
Accountable governance usually requires mechanisms at higher or lower levels that enables 
citizens to hold officials at any one level of government responsible for their actions. 
Sawyer (chapter 13, this volume) also stresses the importance of enhancing polycentricity 
in evolving governance systems in post-conflict settings of Africa. Local communities can 
undertake many forms of collective action more effectively by drawing on their own 
evolved institutions rather than demanding centralized solutions. 
 
In a multi-level system, then, a key is devolving authority to the lowest level that can take 
effective action related to the scale of a particular collective action problem. In regard to 
the registration of land, for example, Alden Wily (chapter 15, this volume) reviews the land 
registration systems throughout most of Africa and finds that smaller units with 
considerable autonomy and more accessibility to landowners, are cheaper, speedier and 
more effective (i.e., they increase the proportion of land that is actually registered). Simply 
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deconcentrating land registration is not, Alden Wiley finds, as effecting in achieving these 
benefits as moving the authority to undertake land registration to a semi-autonomous local 
unit of governance. The advice is: Go as close to the problem you are trying to help as 
feasible. 
 
In a globalizing economy, the principle of subsidiarity also recognizes that for some 
purposes the appropriate level is international rather than any governance mechanism 
within a particular nation. Christensen (chapter 3, this volume) urges scholars and 
policymakers to abandon the Westphalian paradigm that assumes that sovereign national 
states are the world’s primary policy actors. He argues that participants in the ‘non-
sovereign/informal sector’ organized at international, national, regional, and local levels are 
major actors that are ignored by policy that focuses entirely on the role of sovereign actors. 
NGOs organized at multiple levels are participants in the construction of soft law through 
the negotiation of treaties or the recognition of customary practices. Soft law, as 
Christensen explains it, would be called ‘norms’ by some scholars since it reflects the 
aversion of many national governments to international law as such but the recognition by 
the same national governments that agreements at the international level must be negotiated 
and followed. So for larger scale problems, the principal of subsidiarity is that when the 
problem is genuinely international in scope, then one must go to the international level to 
try to solve it rather than remaining with an outdated concept of the sovereign state. 
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Balance between ‘Formal’ Interventions and ‘Informal’ Practices 
Sometimes in their eagerness to solve problems on the ground, government officials keep 
imposing more and more formal legislation without recognizing how this impacts on 
informal practices, how multiple and rapid changes introduce confusion, and why those 
involved eventually ignore the pronouncements of governments and work out some kind of 
arrangements on the ground which may be entirely contrary to what policymakers prefer. 
Imposed rules can crowd out norms and rules evolved in self-organized groups (Frey and 
Jegen 2001). 
 
Roever (chapter 14, this volume) graphically accounts how officials in Peru—the country 
where de Soto (1989) started his analysis of the impact of overly formalized rules on the 
‘informal’ sector—continued their past practices of imposing more and more rules on street 
vendors. The definitions of who is a street vendor differ across legislation, the nature of a 
fee to be imposed on a street vendor differs, how the fees were to be collected and, more 
important, what services the fees were to support, changed often within a few years. The 
executive decrees issued after the election of Fujimori to the presidency involved more 
definitions of key terms and less coherence. The end result has been a ‘dizzying array of 
conflicting incentives’ for the street vendors as well as for local officials. 
 
Shuaib (2004) also looks at the inter-tie between government actions and the outcomes in 
regard to street vending in many developing countries. He specifically examines the 
features of the ‘urban informal street food sector’ (UISFS) in the urban landscape of many 
developing countries. Given the increasing volume of food sold by street vendors 
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throughout the developing world, finding ways of increasing the safety of the food sold in 
this manner is a recognized challenge. Shuaib focuses on the selling of ‘lunch packets’ by 
street vendors in Colombo, Sri Lanka as an important case to illustrate these problems.  
 
In contrast to the efforts of Peruvian officials, the Colombo Municipal Council has not 
recently tried to adopt multiple formal rules (even though there are multiple legislative acts 
on the books that authorize regulation of food processes). Rather, the Municipal Council 
has recently urged street vendors to stamp their names and addresses on the lunch packets 
they offer for sale. They have worked with local NGOs to increase their own capacity to 
monitor the quality of food sold, and have generally gained more information about the 
sector. Shuaib recommends that the Council formally recognize an organization of food 
street vendors and work directly with them to increase the facilities provided for street 
vendors, to reduce the multiplicity of definitions used and thus the lack of coherent and 
workable rules, and generate more effective information for all of those involved. 
 
From these and related literature, the general advice is: Try not to replace or ‘crowd out’ 
informal rules that are generally understood and may potentially be relatively effective, but 
help to fine-tune them instead. Don’t keep passing new legislation when past legislation is 
massively ignored on the ground (Alden Wiley, chapter 15, this volume). Find out what the 
problems are on the ground and involve those who will be regulated in a real discussion of 
the sources of problems and how new formal rules might solve the problems being faced. 
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Implementation Capacity  
The third lesson is to tailor the intervention to the capacity of the structure. This comes 
from some of the empirical work in the volume where they show that over regulation when 
the regulatory units are very weak and incompetent is a terrible thing. The same level of 
regulation in a competent governance structure appears to have a positive macro economic 
effect. Try to avoid the natural tendency to create complex legislation. Where possible, 
build up the capacity of local regional units so that they can handle the desired regulation. 
The advice is: Tailor the intervention to the capacity that exists or help to build the capacity 
before you do an intervention. 
 
Nugent and Swaminathan (chapter 12, this volume) illustrate a positive example of this 
lesson. When the government of Indonesian provided active backing for the capabilities of 
local health centers, this increased capacity helped to generate still further levels of 
volunteer labour by women served by the centers. Thus, modest investments in capacity 
building leveraged more active participation in the provision of health care in local 
villages. 
 
Andersson and Pacheco (chapter 11, this volume) also illustrate the differential impact of a 
massive decentralization programme adopted in Bolivia on the actual policies adopted by 
municipalities. Simply assigning formal property rights is not a sufficient policy 
intervention to insure that timber practices are improved and commercial income increased. 
Municipalities that were well connected to higher level government agencies that helped to 
increase their capacity as well as link to local users were more able to utilize effectively the 
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new property rights assigned to them. In none of the communities studied had local users 
acquired logging permits without substantial external technical support. 
 
Complementary Interventions 
The fourth lesson is that a successful intervention really needs multiple backup services in 
terms of information, courts, larger scale contexts, social capital, etc. Loayza et al. (chapter 
7, this volume) conclude from their cross-country analyzes that high levels of regulating 
goods and factor markets is a major negative factor effecting macroeconomic performance. 
Many regulations act as barriers that disrupt the processes of private investment in new 
technologies for being more efficient and the need for resource reallocation to keep up with 
dynamic process. Their general finding is that governmental regulation tends to reduce 
economic growth. They find, however, that the quality of regulation—as measured by the 
institutional framework within which regulation is occurring—makes a big difference. In 
those countries where the broader institutions themselves are evaluated in World Bank 
studies as of high quality, the same regulations that produce bad outcomes in most 
countries are actually effective in the countries with high quality general institutions.  
 
Guhu-Khasnobis and Ahuja (chapter 10, this volume) provide a specific example of the 
effectiveness of a multi-organization package. In their study of the insurance for informal 
economy workers in India, they point out how difficult it has been in the past to offer 
insurance to those who are poor and earn irregular income. And yet, it is just such a 
population that is most in need of insurance. Insurance for low-income workers is feasible 
only when it can be provided in a very cost-effective manner that is designed specifically to 
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meet the needs of those at risk. By working with ‘nodal agencies’ in the form of an NGO, a 
women’s group, a trade union, a micro-finance organization, or an organization of micro-
entrepreneurs, the transaction costs of delivering insurance, receiving payments, informing 
users of benefits, etc., are dramatically reduced.  
 
Use Voting With Their Feet as an Evaluation Criteria 
The fifth lesson has to do with a test of whether current formalizations are working or not. 
The test is the extent to which people are willing to be within the net. Basically, we can see 
street vendors, small businesses and people who might gain formal ownership to their 
structures voting with their feet. If they decide to register, pay whatever taxes there are, 
etc., they are voluntarily coming within the net and this is a good sign. Thus, if you change 
the structure to benefit group a, b, or c, one of the criteria is whether voluntary compliance 
is increasing or not. The advice is: A good test of whether an intervention is helpful or not 
is to know how many of the relevant population try to be outside of the net.  
 
Lensink, McGillivray, and Thi Thu Trà (chapter 8, this volume) studied the effects of 
financial reforms in Vietnam. Traditionally, Vietnam always had a vibrant informal 
financial sector, which fulfilled the credit needs of a large section of the population. 
Among other things, the reforms changed the composition of the formal and informal 
activities. However, they find that the relative importance of lending has gone up in what 
still remains as the ‘informal’ part of the financial sector.  
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The growing literature on informal trade (e.g., Pohit and Taneja 2004), provide examples 
where traders prefer to remain outside the ambit of official trade, because it is too costly 
and often beyond their logistical capacity to comprehend and hence comply with ‘rules’. A 
reflection of this is found in the current WTO negotiation on trade facilitation. In principle, 
the negotiation is meant to enhance trade. However, the uncertainty regarding the costs that 
developing and least developed countries will have to incur to implement the outcome of 
this negotiation has resulted in plenty of apprehension in such countries, who may simply 
decide to walk out of it.  
 
1.5 CONCLUSION 
The debate on what exactly constitutes informality and formality continues, more than half 
a century after the distinction was first introduced, and more than three decades after it took 
centre stage in the development policy discourse. We point to the multiple definitions and 
characterizations and come to two conclusions on the formal–informal divide—one 
negative and one positive. The negative conclusion is that the tendency to associate 
‘informal’ with ‘unstructured’ and ‘chaotic’ must end. Such an association is conceptually 
unsound, empirically weak, and has led to policy disasters as the state reached to provide 
‘structures’ where it was presumed that none existed before. The positive conclusion is that 
we can fruitfully use the terminology of informal–formal to characterize a continuum of the 
reach of official intervention in different economic activities, especially since official 
statistics already use variants of such a criterion. However, it is to be clearly understood, as 
is made abundantly clear in the chapters in this volume, that ‘more’ or ‘less’ reach is not 
necessarily ‘better’ or ‘worse’. Different types of intervention work best in different 
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circumstances. The general principles outlined in this chapter, drawn from an array of 
detailed empirical investigations, suggest strongly that we should move beyond formality 
and informality, and tackle directly the policy interventions that will help the poor to 
unlock their potential through groups and through markets. 
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Notes 
                                                 
i Loayza et al. (chapter 7, this volume), for example, note that there are at least 7 areas of a firm’s activity 
that are potentially subject to regulation: entry, exit, labour market relationship, fiscal burden, international 
trade, financial markets, and contract enforcement. 
ii Christensen (chapter 3, this volume) points out the importance of the international level as well. 
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